Many years ago a game warden in California by the name of
Carl Lund was found dead in his government-issued car in a remote location in the
northern part of the state. He had been on duty the night of his death, and the
area was one where illegal deer hunting often occurred. As a convenience, wardens’
cars had been equipped with beds, and the wardens were permitted to sleep in
them when on night patrol.
Lund failed to return from one such outing, and a search
discovered him dead in his car. The two-way radio, ignition switch, and heater
were on and the gas tank was empty. All the windows but one small wing vent
were closed. Lund’s skin was cherry red, a classic sign of carbon monoxide
poisoning. The scene was that of a common suicide or accidental asphyxiation,
except for one thing: beside Lund’s body was the similarly dead body of a
woman, one Chelsea Miami. “The bodies were clad respectively only in shorts and
panties and were partially covered by a blanket,” according to the court
opinion. You can do the math.
Lund’s widow filed a workers compensation claim, asserting
that her husband's death had occurred in the line of duty. The state—Lund’s former
employer—argued that he had left his post in favor of dalliance, that he was
therefore not on duty at the time, and that workers compensation was therefore not
due. The Industrial Accident Commission, overseer of the workers compensation
system, agreed with Mrs. Lund and issued death benefits. The state appealed.
It is not the prerogative of appellate courts to substitute their
interpretation of the facts for that made in the tribunal below. We saw this in
Buck v. Bell, where Carrie Buck, her
mother, and her daughter were deemed mentally handicapped by the jury based the
evidence before them. Unless there was no way a reasonable jury could have reached
that conclusion from the evidence presented, those facts had to be accepted by the
appellate courts. Their only province is to determine whether the lower courts
applied the law correctly.
Interestingly, the situation is much like the instant replay
rule in professional sports. Unless a review shows that the referee's call was
clearly wrong, “the ruling on the field stands.”
In Lund, the California appellate court clearly knew what
was going on that car one chilly night in 1948. They even said as much:
[W]e are well aware of
the contrary inferences which might have been drawn from the same set of facts.
The secluded spot in a remote area could have been selected by Lund for its
advantages as a rendezvous in which to conduct an illicit love affair. The
manner in which the cars were parked, the state of partial dishabille [undress]
in which the bodies were found, the fact that Lund had divested himself of his
uniform and placed his gun and boots underneath the seat, all are circumstances
from which the trier of facts [in this case, the Industrial Accident Commission]
might have reasonably concluded that he had either abandoned or deviated from
his duty.
In other words, had these judges been sitting on the Commission
they might have decided that at the time of his death Lund was more engaged in
sexual congress than law enforcement and should not be entitled to benefits. But
workers compensation laws intentionally favor claimants, and the judges could
not say that the commissioners’ decision was clearly wrong. They wrote:
Lund, while
acting in the scope of his employment, was permitted to drive to isolated spots
where game violators might be found. It was a matter of discretion with him
whether or not at such times he converted the car into a bed and slept. In so
doing he was acting within the course of his employment. There was no rule
which forbade him from having company while on duty, and the presence of a
woman in the car with him does not necessarily compel a conclusion that he had
thereby either abandoned his employment or deviated therefrom.
To use a twenty-first century expression, Lund was
“multi-tasking.” And one can sensibly conclude that he was still on duty at the
time of his death. So the court deferred to the judgment of the IAC. “There
being a choice between two inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence,
we cannot say that the commission acted … in excess of its power or that its
findings of fact were unreasonable,” the opinion states.
Although undoubtedly chagrined by the circumstances, Mrs.
Lund was probably somewhat mollified by the outcome of the case.
No word on the family of the late Ms. Miami. ■
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